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REPLY ARGUMENT
POINT I - PLAINTIFF VIOLATED THE INSURANCE CODE.
A.

Mr. Mills 1 Acts Related to the Law.

Plaintiff in his

Answering Brief claims difficulty in relating the facts of this
case to a violation of the Insurance Code.

Defendant is happy

to clarify the violation by relating Mr. Mills' acts to the
law.
1.

The "performance bond" executed by Mr. Mills is a

contract of insurance as defined by 31-1-7, because it is a
"contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify another or to
pay an amount upon determinable risk contingencies."
2.

Signing and delivering the bond to Mr. Bradshaw

was a "transaction of insurance" as defined by 31-1-11 because
it was "execution of an insurance contract."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-23.

Mr. Mills caused his agency to become an insurer

as defined in 31-1-10 because it became "engaged as surety*"
4.

Mr. Mills' agency did not have a certificate of

authority to transact insurance business.
5c

Mr. Mills caused his agency to violate the pro-

visions of 31-5-2 because "no insurer shall transact any
insurance in this state except that authorized by a valid
and existing certificate of authority issued to it by the
Commissioner."
6.

Mr. Mills "knowingly participated in the violation

of a provision of the Insurance Code" contrary to 31-17-50 (b)
by causing his agency to act as an insurer without a certificate of authority.
7.

Mr. Mills, "in the conduct of his affairs under

his license," in causing his agency to act as an insurer
without a certificate of authority, "showed himself to be
and was deemed by the Commissioner to be untrustworthy"
contrary to the provisions of 31-17-50(h).
8.

Mr. Mills in causing his agency to act as an insurer

without a certificate of authority "exercised powers relative
to insurance outside the scope of his licensing" contrary
to the provisions of 31-17-50 (i).
9.

Mr. Mills in causing his agency to act as an

insurer without a certificate of authority did not "act in
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-3good faith, abstain from deception and practice honesty,"
nor did he "preserve inviolate the integrity of insurance11
as required by 31-1-8.
B.

Mr. Mills' Agency was an "insurer."

Plaintiff's answering argument in Point I is largely
devoted to maintaining that Mr. Mills did not cause his agency
to act as an insurer because although the performance bond
was "insurance" and the execution of the bond was. an "insurance
transaction" the agency was not an "insurer" so as to require
a certificate of authority.

This so claims Plaintiff, because

this transaction of insurance was an isolated one for which
no premium was charged.
A discussion of the definition of "insurer" will be
helpful.

We believe the definition as set out in 31-1-10

reads as if phrased as follows:
"Insurer" includes every person engaged as:
1.

Indemnitor,

2.

Surety, or

3.

Contractor in the business of entering into contracts

of insurance or annuity.
We believe the phrase "in the business of entering into
contracts of insurance or annuity" modifies only contractor
and not either surety or indemnitor.

We believe this phrase

was used primarily to eliminate from the definition of
insurer "the insured" who is also a "contractor."
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Both

-4"indemnitor" and "surety" by definition include entering into
contracts of insurance.

If the phrase were construed to

modify both indemnitor and surety as well, this section would
be read as,
"Insurer" includes every person engaged as indemnitor in
the business of enteringvinto contracts of insurance."
which is not only redundant and circular, but not sensible.
Although we believe the intent of the legislature as
expressed in the wording is clear it should also be noted
that the rules of legislative construction require such a
result.

Under the doctrine of the so-called "last antecedent,"

phrases are to be applied to the words or phrases imrnediately
preceeding and are not to be construed as extending to others
more remote.

2 CJS "Statutes" §334 and U.S. - Buscaglis v

Bowie, C C A . Puerto Rico, 139 F.2d 294 - Corpus Juris cited
in U.S. ex rel Santarelli v Hughes, C C A . N.J. 116, F2d,
613,616; Utah - Corpus Juris cited in State v Navaro, 26 P.2d
955, 959, 83 Utah 6 - Dunn v Bryan, 200 P.253, 77 Utah 604.
It should also be noted there is no comma separating "contractor" from "in the business of entering into contracts of
insurance or annuity."

This type punctuation as a general

rule is construed to mean the clause modifies only the last
antecedent and not all the preceding clauses.

82 CJS "Statutes"

§334 and S.D. Lewis v Annie Creek Mining Co., 48 N.W. 2d 815.
Finally, we think the results which would flow from
Plaintiff's interpretation would be contrary to the whole idea
of regulating
by
nature, provides
Digitized byinsurance.
the Howard W. Hunter LawInsurance,
Library, J. Reuben Clark
Law its
School, BYU.
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-6Mr. Bradshaw together with a Mills-Gundry card to make the
necessary changes and completions is a sorry story.

It tells

clearer than confession that Mr. Mills was aware he was doing
a wrong.

It also says something about Mr* Mills.

He was

willing to implicate Mr. Bradshaw in a wrong instead of
independently assuming the responsibility of an insurance
transaction himself as a licensed insurance agent knowledge
able in the field.

These circumstances do not exculpate Mr.

Mills but damn him.
B*

The Violation is Serious.

Let us look at the exposure of the bank.

Assume the bank

had accepted the performance bond as tendered them.

Assume

they then loaned the $1,000,000 for construction of the building with the building forming a substantial part of the security for the loan.

Assume the contractor did not build the

building in accordance with the plans and specifications but
shortcut the foundation by using less steel than required
and less cement in the concrete than required so the building
when completed was unacceptable and had to be razed.

The

bank would be out the $1,000,000 but would not have the
contemplated building as security.

These circumstances are

remote of happening, but are the very kinds of circumstances
against which the bank was trying to safeguard itself in
requiring the performance bond.

When Mr. Mills caused to be

placed in the stream of commerce the bond which had all of
the appearances of being executed by an insurer qualified
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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